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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) plays an ever-increasing role
in advanced automotive functionality for driver assistance and
autonomous operation; however, its adequacy from the perspec-
tive of safety certification remains controversial. In this paper,
we analyze the impacts that the use of ML as an implementation
approach has on ISO 26262 safety lifecycle and ask what could be
done to address them. We then provide a set of recommendations
on how to adapt the standard to accommodate ML.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of machine learning (ML) is on the rise in many
sectors of software development, and automotive software
development is no different. In particular, Advanced Driver
Assistance Systems (ADAS) and Autonomous Vehicles (AV)
are two areas where ML plays a significant role [1], [2]. In
automotive development, safety is a critical objective, and the
emergence of standards such as ISO 26262 [3] has helped
focus industry practices to address safety in a systematic and
consistent way. Unfortunately, ISO 26262 was not designed to
accommodate technologies such as ML, and this has created a
tension between the need to innovate and the need to improve
safety.
In response to this issue, research has been active in several
areas. Recently, the safety of ML approaches in general
have been analyzed both from theoretical [4] and pragmatic
perspectives [5]. However, most research is specifically about
neural networks (NN). Work on supporting the verification
& validation (V&V) of NNs emerged in the 1990’s with a
focus on making their internal structure easier to assess by
extracting representations that are more understandable [6].
General V&V methodologies for NNs have also been pro-
posed [7], [8]. More recently, with the popularity of deep
neural networks (DNN), verification research has included
more diverse topics such as generating explanations of DNN
predictions [9], improving the stability of classification [10]
and property checking of DNNs [11].
Despite their challenges, NNs are already used in high as-
surance systems (see [12] for a survey), and safety certification
of NNs has received some attention. Pullum et al. [13] give
detailed guidance on V&V as well as other aspects of safety
assessment such as hazard analysis with a focus on adaptive
systems in the the aerospace domain. Bedford et al. [14]
define general requirements for addressing NNs in any safety
standard. Kurd et al. [15] have established criteria for NNs to
use in a safety case.
The recent surge of interest in AV has also been driving
research in certification. Koopman and Wagner [2] identify
some of the key challenges to certification, including ML.
Martin et al. [16] analyze the adequacy of ISO 26262 for AV
but focus on the impact of the increased complexity it creates
rather than specifically the use of ML. Finally, Spanfelner
et al. [1] assess ISO 26262 from the perspective of driver
assistance systems.
The contribution of the current paper is complementary to
the above research. We analyze the impact that the use of ML-
based software has on various parts of ISO 26262. Specifically,
we consider its impact in the areas of hazard analysis and in the
phases of the software development process. In all, we identify
five distinct problems that the use of ML creates and make
recommendations on steps toward addressing these problems
both through changes to the standard and through additional
research.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II, we give the required background on ISO 26262 and
ML. Sec. III contains the analysis of the ISO 26262 safety
lifecycle with five subsections describing each impacted area
and the corresponding recommendations. Finally, in Sec. IV,
we summarize and give concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ISO 26262
ISO 26262 is a standard that regulates functional safety of
road vehicles. It recommends the use of a Hazard Analysis
and Risk Assessment (HARA) method to identify hazardous
events in the system and to specify safety goals that mitigate
the hazards. The standard has 10 parts, but we focus on Part
6: “product development at the software level”. The standard
follows the well-known V model for engineering shown in
Fig. 1.
An Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) refers to a risk
classification scheme defined in ISO 26262 for an item (e.g.,
subsystem) in an automotive system. The ASIL represents
the degree of rigor required (e.g., testing techniques, types of
documentation required, etc.) to reduce the risk of the item,
where ASIL D represents the highest and ASIL A the lowest
risk. If an element is assigned QM (Quality Management), it
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does not require safety management. The ASIL assessed for a
given hazard is first assigned to the safety goal set to address
the hazard and is then inherited by the safety requirements
derived from that goal.
Specification of software 
safety requirements
Software architectural 
design
Software unit design and 
implementation
Verification of software 
safety requirements
Software integration and 
testing
Software unit testing
Design phase
verification
Design phase
verification
Software 
testing
Software 
testing
Software 
testing
Fig. 1. ISO 26262 part 6 - Product development at the software level.
Part 6 of the standard specifies the compliance requirements
for software development. For example, Fig. 2 shows the
error handling mechanisms recommended for use as part of
the architectural design. The degree of recommendation for a
method depends on the ASIL and is categorized as follows:
++ indicates that the method is highly recommended for the
ASIL; + indicates that the method is recommended for the
ASIL; and o indicates that the method has no recommendation
for or against its usage for the ASIL. For example, Graceful
Degradation (1b) is the only highly recommended mechanism
for an ASIL C item, while an ASIL D item would also require
Independent Parallel Redundancy (1c).
Methods
ASIL
A B C D
1a Static recovery mechanism + + + +
1b Graceful degradation + + ++ ++
1c Independent parallel redundancy o o + ++
1d Correcting codes for data + + + +
Fig. 2. ISO 26262 Part 6 - Mechanisms for error handling at the software
architectural level.
B. Machine learning
In this paper, we are concerned with software implemen-
tation using ML. We call a programmed component to be
one that is implemented using a programming language,
regardless of whether the programming was done manually or
automatically (e.g., via code generation). In contrast, an ML
component is one that is a trained model using a supervised,
unsupervised or reinforcement learning (RL) approach.
There are several characteristics of ML that can impact
safety or safety assessment.
Non-transparency. All types of ML models contain knowl-
edge in an encoded form, but this encoding is harder to
interpret for humans in some types than others. For example, a
Bayesian Network for weather prediction is easier to interpret
since the nodes are random variables representing human-
defined concepts such as “precipitation type”, “temperature”,
etc. In contrast, NN models are considered non-transparent,
and significant research effort has been devoted to making
them more transparent (e.g., [6], [9]). Increasing ML model
expressive power is typically at the expense of transparency
but some research efforts focus on mitigating this [17]. Non-
transparency is an obstacle to safety assurance because it is
more difficult for an assessor to develop confidence that the
model is operating as intended.
Error rate. An ML model typically does not operate
perfectly and exhibits some error rate. Thus, “correctness” of
an ML component, even with respect to test data, is seldom
achieved and it must be assumed that it will periodically
fail. Furthermore, although an estimate of the true error rate
is an output of the ML development process, there is only
a statistical guarantee about the reliability of this estimate.
Finally, even if the estimate of the true error rate was accurate,
it may not reflect the error rate the system actually experiences
while in operation after a finite set of inputs because the
true error is based on an infinite set of samples [4]. These
characteristics must be considered when designing safe system
using ML components.
Training-based. Supervised and unsupervised learning
based ML models are trained using a subset of possible inputs
that could be encountered operationally. Thus, the training set
is necessarily incomplete and there is no guarantee that it is
even representative of the space of possible inputs. In addition,
learning may overfit a model by capturing details incidental
to the training set rather than general to all inputs. RL suffers
from similar limitations since it typically explores only a
subset of possible behaviours during training. The uncertainty
that this creates about how an ML component will behave is
a threat to safety. Another factor is that, even if the training
set is representative, it may under-represent the safety-critical
cases because these are often rarer in the input space [4].
Instability. More powerful ML models (e.g., DNN) are
typically trained using local optimization algorithms, and
there can be multiple optima. Thus, even when the training
set remains the same, the training process may produce a
different result. However, changing the training set also may
change the optima. In general, different optima may be far
apart structurally, even if they are similar behaviourally. This
characteristic makes it difficult to debug models or reuse parts
of previous safety assessments.
III. ANALYSIS OF ISO 26262
In this section, we detail our analysis of ML impacts on
ISO 26262. Since an ML component is a specialized type
of software component, we define an area of the standard
as impacted when it is relevant to software components and
the treatment of an ML component should differ from the
existing treatment of software components by the standard.
Applying this criterion to the ten parts of the standard resulted
in identifying five areas of impact in two parts: the hazard
analysis from the concept phase (Part 3) and the software
development phase (Part 6). We describe the five areas of
impact with corresponding recommendations in the following
subsections.
A. Identifying hazards
ISO 26262 defines a hazard as “a potential source of harm
caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item where harm
is physical injury or damage to the health of persons” [3, Part
1]. The use of ML can create new types of hazards. One type
of such hazard is caused by the human operator becoming
complacent because they think the automated driver assistance
(often using ML) is smarter than it actually is [18]. For
example, the driver stops monitoring steering in an automated
steering function. On one level, this can be viewed as a
case of “reasonably forseeable misuse” by the operator, and
such misuse is identified in ISO 26262 as requiring mitiga-
tion [3, Part 3]. However, this approach may be too simplistic.
As ML creates opportunities for increasingly sophisticated
driver assistance, the role of the human operator becomes
increasingly critical to correct for malfunctions. But increasing
automation can create behavioural changes in the operator,
reducing their skill level and limiting their ability to respond
when needed [19]. Such behavioural impacts can negatively
impact safety even though there is no system malfunction or
misuse.
Other new types of hazards are due to the unique ways an
ML component can fail. For RL, faults in the reward function
can cause surprising failures. An RL-based component may
negatively affect the environment in order to achieve its
goal [5]. For example, an AV may break laws in order to
reach a destination faster. Another possibility is that the RL
component games the reward function [5]. For example, the
AV figures out that it can avoid getting penalized for driving
too close to other cars by exploiting certain sensor vulnera-
bilities so that it can’t “see” how close it is getting. Although
hazards such as these may be unique to ML components, they
can be traced to faults, and thus they fit within the existing
guidelines of ISO 26262.
Recommendations for ISO 26262: The definition of hazard
should be broadened to include harm potentially caused by
complex behavioural interactions between humans and the
vehicle that are not due to a system malfunction. The standard
itself takes note that the current definition is “restricted to the
scope of ISO 26262; a more general definition is potential
source of harm”[3, Part 1]. The definition and methods for
identifying such hazards should be informed by the research
specifically on behavioural impacts of ADAS [20] as well as
human-robot interaction (HRI)[21] more broadly. For example,
van den Brule et al. [22] study how a robot’s behavioural style
can affect the trust of humans interacting with it.
B. Faults and failure modes
ISO 26262 mandates the use of analyses such as Fault Mode
Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify how faults lead to failures
that may cause harm (i.e., are hazards). We can ask whether
there are types of faults and failures that are unique to ML
and not found in programmed software. Specific fault types
and failure modes have been catalogued for NNs (e.g., [13],
[15]). Some of these are just “apparent” ML specific faults.
For example, a neuron that randomly changes its connection
in an operational NN is not really about neurons but rather a
conventional fault that can occur in the software on which the
NN runs. Others are distinctly ML-specific such as faults in
the network topology, learning algorithm or training set. This
creates the opportunity to develop focused tools and techniques
to help find faults independently of the domain for which the
ML model is being trained.
Although ML faults have some unique characteristics, this
cannot be said about failure modes. All faults can do is to
increase the error rate of the deployed component, and thus
cause one particular type of failure – an incorrect output for
some input. But since most software failures take the form
of incorrect output for a given input, we may conclude that
there is nothing different about the failure analysis of an ML
component as compared to a programmed component, and
existing ISO 26262 recommendations apply.
Recommendations for ISO 26262: Require the use of fault
detection tools and techniques that take into account the unique
features of ML. For example, Chakarov et al. [23] describe a
technique for debugging mis-classifications due to bad training
in data, while Nushi et al. [24] propose an approach for
troubleshooting faults due to complex interactions between
linked ML components.
C. The use of training sets
Spanfelner et al. [1] point out that there is an assumption in
ISO 26262, given by the left side of the V model (Fig. 1), that
component behaviour is fully specified and each refinement
can be verified with respect to its specification. Note that this
assumption is also made in other safety-critical domains such
as aerospace [25]. This is important to ensure that a safety
argument can trace the behaviour of the implementation to its
design, safety requirements and ultimately, to the hazards that
are mitigated.
This assumption is violated when a training set is used
in place of a specification since such a set is necessarily
incomplete, and it is not clear how to create assurance that
the corresponding hazards are always mitigated. Thus, an ML
component violates the assumption. Furthermore, the training
process is not a verification process since the trained model
will be “correct by construction” with respect to the training
set, up to the limits of the model and the learning algorithm.
A more careful analysis of the development lifecycle for
an ML component shows that there are multiple levels of
specification and implementation, some of which may satisfy
the assumption in the standard. High-level requirements for
the component, although abstract, can be expressed with
completeness and traced to up to hazards. For example, the
component may be required to “identify pedestrians” that the
AV should avoid harming. Detailed data requirements can
be specified carefully to ensure that an appropriate training,
validation and testing sets are obtained. Subsequently, the data
gathered can be verified with respect to this specification.
Completeness is still an issue but coverage can be used as
a surrogate, as it is with the design of test sets for software
testing.
A deeper issue, discussed by Spanfelner et al. [1], is that
many kinds of advanced functionality require perception of the
environment, and this functionality may be inherently unspeci-
fiable. For example, what is the specification for recognizing
a pedestrian? We might observe that since a vehicle must
move around in a human world, advanced functionality must
involve perception of human categories (e.g., pedestrians).
There is evidence that such categories can only partially be
specified using rules (e.g., necessary and sufficient conditions)
and also need examples [26]. This suggests that ML-based
approaches may actually be required for implementing this
type of functionality.
Recommendations for ISO 26262: The approach to safe
implementation should be geared to the type of functionality
being implemented. If the functionality is fully specifiable,
then conventional programming can be required. In other
cases, such as advanced functionality requiring perception,
ML-based approaches should be used, and the complete spec-
ification requirement must be relaxed. Partial specifications
can be required, where possible. For example, if a pedestrian
must be less than 9 feet tall, then this property can be used to
filter out false positives. Such properties can be incorporated
into the training process or checked on models after training
(e.g., [11]).
Training set specifications and coverage metrics must be
required to improve training set quality. Ensemble methods
such as boosting and decision fusion can also be recommended
to improve the error rate. However, when the ASIL level is
high, it is unlikely that the error rate can ever be brought to
an acceptably low level only through increasing or improv-
ing the training set (due to the “curse of dimensionality”).
Therefore, fault tolerance strategies for software must be
required. For example, redundant pedestrian recognizers using
different ML models and training sets can be used to detect
potential recognition failures when there is disagreement.
Another possibility is to define a “safety envelope” of possible
known safe behaviours and limit the ML component to choose
among them [27]. Some of these recommendations may be
addressed in a forth-coming OMG standard relating to sensor
and perception issues [28].
D. Level of ML usage
Fig. 1 identifies an architectural level and a unit (i.e.,
component) level of implementation. ISO 26262 defines a
software architecture as consisting of components and their
interactions in a hierarchical structure [3, Part 6]. This com-
ponent decomposition is important for safety because it allows
for easier comprehension of a complex system by human
assessors and it permits the use of compositional formal
analysis techniques.
ML could be used to implement an entire software system,
including its architecture, using an end-to-end approach. For
example, Bojarski et al. [29] train a DNN to make the
appropriate steering commands directly from raw sensor data,
side-stepping typical AV architectural components such as lane
detection, path planning, etc.
Here, we may assume that the unit level, in the conventional
sense of a distinct component that can be developed indepen-
dently of the architecture, no longer exists. This is the case,
even if it is possible to extract and interpret the structure of
the trained model as consisting of units with distinct functions,
since this structure is emergent in the training process and
unstable. If the model is re-trained with a slightly different
training set, this structure can change arbitrarily. Note that
a DNN does have an architecture in a different sense – the
set of layers and their connections. However, since it is the
training that actually “implements” the required functionality,
this architecture is more of an generic execution layer. Thus,
an end-to-end approach deeply challenges the assumptions
underlying ISO 26262.
Another challenge with an end-to-end approach is that,
in some cases, the the size of the training set needs to be
exponentially larger than when a programmed architecture is
used [30]. This puts additional strain on the already challeng-
ing problem of obtaining an adequate training set for safety-
critical contexts.
Finally, note that issues with an end-to-end approach can
also apply when ML is used at the component level, if
components are too complex. For example, at one extreme,
the architecture can consist of a single component. ISO
26262 specifically guards against this pitfall by mandating the
use of modularity principles such as restricting the size of
components and maximizing the cohesion within a compo-
nent. However, the lack of transparency of ML components
can hamper the ability to assess component complexity and
therefore, to apply these principles. Fortunately, improving ML
transparency is an active research area (e.g., [9], [6]).
Recommendations for ISO 26262: Although using an
end-to-end approach has shown some recent successes with
autonomous driving (e.g., [29]), we recommend that an end-
to-end use of ML not be encouraged by ISO 26262, due to its
incompatibility with the assumptions about stable hierarchical
architectures of components.
E. Required software techniques
Part 6 of ISO 26262 deals with product development at
the software level and specifies 75 software development
techniques, such as shown in Fig. 2, that are used in various
phases of the development process in the V model (Fig. 1).
Of these, 34 apply at the unit level, and the remaining at
the architectural level. We performed an assessment of the
software techniques to determine their applicability to ML
components1. Based on our recommendation in Sec III-D,
we assumed that ML was only used at the unit level and
programming is used at the architecture level to connect
components.
The charts in Fig. 3 show the results of the assessment
for the techniques dealing with the unit level. We classified
each technique into one of three categories based on the level
of applicability to ML. Category Ok means the technique
1The data is available at https://github.com/rsalay/safetyml
is directly applicable without modification. Most of these
cases are due to the fact that they are black box techniques
(e.g., analysis of boundary values, error guessing, etc.) and
thus, the method of component implementation is irrelevant.
However, some white box techniques such as fault injection
also apply. For example, faults can be injected into an NN
by breaking links or randomly changing weights (e.g., [31]).
Category Adapt says that the technique can be used for an
ML component if it is adapted in some way. For example, the
technique walk-through can’t be used directly with an NN due
to the non-transparency characteristic. Finally, category N/A
indicates that the technique is fundamentally code-oriented and
does not apply to an ML component. For example, no multiple
use of variable names is meaningful for a program but has no
corresponding notion in an ML model.
The results in Chart (a) are grouped by the degree to
which the techniques are recommended. Recall from Sec. II
that each technique is marked as highly recommended (++),
recommended (+) or no recommendation (o) depending on the
ASIL level. The bars in each category show the percentage
of techniques that apply when considering all techniques
(0,+,++), only the recommended techniques (+, ++), and only
the highly recommended techniques (++). Since the degree
of recommendation varies by ASIL, each percentage is an
average value over all four ASILs with the standard deviation
in parentheses. Note that the standard deviation is 0 for
the “all” group since every technique is present for each
ASIL. Because of the high standard deviation for the highly
recommended group, we have included Chart (b) which gives
the actual data for each ASIL in this group.
Chart (a) shows that a significant part of the standard is
still directly applicable (category Ok) and there is an emphasis
on highly recommended techniques. However, the standard
deviation is high and Chart (b) shows that most of these highly
recommended techniques apply to the lower ASIL values – i.e.
they are less relevant from a safety critical perspective. Chart
(a) also shows that about 40% of the techniques do not apply at
all (category N/A) regardless of the degree of recommendation.
In general, techniques in the software part of the standard are
clearly biased toward imperative programming languages (e.g.,
C, Java, etc.) [25]. In addition to precluding ML components,
this bias makes it difficult to accept implementations in other
mature programming paradigms such as functional program-
ming, logic programming, etc.
Recommendations for ISO 26262: One approach to ad-
dressing the gap in applicable techniques as well as the
imperative language bias without compromising safety may
be to specify the requirements for techniques based on their
intent and maturity rather than on their specific details. For
example, the intent of the no multiple use of variable names
technique is to reduce the possibility for confusion that may
prevent the detection of bugs. This helps humans understand
the implementation better and increase their confidence in
its correctness and safety. Thus, the standard can require the
use of “accepted clarity increasing” techniques instead of the
specific techniques.
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Fig. 3. Percentage of unit-level software techniques applicable to ML
components: (a) values averaged over the four ASIL levels with standard
deviation shown in parentheses; (b) values for each ASIL when only highly
recommended techniques are considered.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Machine learning is increasingly seen as an effective soft-
ware implementation technique for delivering advanced func-
tionality; however, how to assure safety when ML is used in
safety critical systems is still an open question. The ISO 26262
standard for functional safety of road vehicles provides a
comprehensive set of requirements for assuring safety but does
not address the unique characteristics of ML-based software.
In this paper, we make a step towards addressing this gap
by analyzing the places where ML can impact the standard
and providing recommendations on how to accommodate this
impact. Our results and recommendations are summarized as
follows.
Identifying hazards. The use of ML can create new
types of hazards that are not due to the malfunctioning of a
component. In particular, the complex behavioural interactions
possible between humans and advanced functionality imple-
mented by ML can create hazardous situations that should be
mitigated within the system design. We recommend that ISO
26262 expands their definition of hazard to address these kinds
of situations.
Fault and failure modes. ML components have a develop-
ment lifecycle that is different from other types of software.
Analyzing the stages in the lifecycle reveals distinct types
of faults they may have. We recommend that ISO 26262 be
extended to explicitly address the ML lifecycle and require the
use of fault detection tools and techniques that are customized
to this lifecycle.
The use of training sets. Because ML components are
trained from inherently incomplete data sets, they violate
the assumption in V model-based processes that component
functionality must be fully specified and that refinements are
verifiable. Furthermore, it is possible that certain types of ad-
vanced functionality (e.g., requiring perception) for which ML
is well suited are unspecifiable in principle. As a result, ML
components are designed with the knowledge that they have
an error rate and that they will periodically fail. Rather than
disqualifying this class of functionality, we recommend that
ISO 26262 provide different safety requirements depending
on whether the functionality is specifiable.
The level of ML usage. ML could be used broadly at
the architectural level with a system by using an end-to-end
approach or remain limited to use at the component level. The
end-to-end approach challenges the assumption that a complex
system is modeled as a stable hierarchical decomposition of
components each with their own function. This limits the
use of most techniques for system safety and we therefore
recommend that ISO 26262 only allow the use of ML at the
component level.
Required software techniques. ISO 26262 mandates the
use of many specific techniques for various stages of the
software development lifecycle. Our analysis shows that while
some of these remain applicable to ML components and others
could readily be adapted, many remain that are specifically
biased toward the assumption that code is implemented using
an imperative programming language. In order to remove this
bias, we recommend that the requirements be expressed in
terms of the intent and maturity of the techniques rather than
their specific details.
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